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Abstract
This thesis reviews the constitutional rights of service members and how they are 
limited by the military. These affected rights include the First Amendment’s rights to 
free speech, religious exercise and the ability to petition the government for redress of 
grievances; the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause; and the Sixth Amendment’s right 
to a jury of one’s peers.
The discussion section of this thesis argues two justifications used by the military 
for limiting service members’ rights. The first justification is in support of good order, 
discipline and morale. The second justification is in support of uniformity. The latter 
discussion also identifies the U.S. Supreme Court’s treatment of the military as a separate 
community and how the military is guided by a different standard. To support the 
separate community justification the U.S. Supreme Court has deferred most of its rulings 
on the rights of service members back to military leaders. At the conclusion of the 
discussion section an application of previous U.S. Supreme Court cases and military court 
cases is used to anticipate the future of the military’s body art policy.
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1Introduction
This thesis analyzes several limitations on service members’ rights. It also 
includes a discussion on the military’s body art policy and whether restrictions on body 
art withstand the U.S. Supreme Court’s scrutiny with regard to constitutionality. By 
examining scholarly journals, U.S. Supreme Court rulings and military regulations, a 
predictable outcome to the future of body art policies is evident.
Service members’ bodies are not exclusively their own. The military has the 
authority to regulate both physical restrictions and requirements such as body fat, physical 
training standards and hair length. As of recently the military has started making 
regulations regarding where and what type o f piercings, brands, tattoos and other body art 
service members can have.
Body art is one of the latest fashion trends. Body art is no longer exclusive to the 
“bad-boy/girl” image. Body art has expanded to all sectors o f society. Men, women, 
young, old, educated and uneducated have chosen to modify their appearances with body 
art (Campanella, 1999). Not only are civilians entering military service with body art, but 
service members are also getting body art while serving on active or reserve duty. In 
response to body art, the military has issued various body art regulations restricting 
where, when and what kind of body art can be located or worn. Due to these restrictions 
many service members are starting to believe that the new body art policies are 
unconstitutional and limit service members right to free speech (Campanella, 1999).
This topic is significantly worthy of study for three main reasons. First, the 
military is subject to intense scrutiny by both the media and the civilians it protects. This 
is evident by the fact that you cannot turn on the television, radio, or pick up a 
newspaper/magazine today without seeing or hearing something about the military. For 
example, the war in Iraq, Afghanistan or another international deployment. Bookstores 
are filled with rows upon rows of military oriented books and movies are constantly being 
made with the military as a setting. However, less than one percent of our nation’s 
population is currently in the military or has served in the military (Rives & Ehlenbeck,
2002). Therefore, a lack of knowledge in the civilian population about the military 
justice system, its laws and applicability is probable. This lack of knowledge may lead to 
misunderstandings surrounding the military and military justice.
Second, all military officers (whether commissioned or noncommissioned) are in 
leadership positions throughout their careers. Without proper knowledge of subordinates’ 
constitutional rights military leaders may lose discipline, morale or unit cohesion 
resulting in the death of subordinates. A working understanding of service members’ 
constitutional rights is important both to military leaders as well as to service members 
themselves. If a diminishment of constitutional rights is warranted service members may 
be more accepting if  the need is clearly documented and explained to them.
Currently military training for officers is primarily focused on the tactical skills 
necessary for their job. For example, the Armor Captain’s Career Course is a sixteen- 
week course designed to prepare captains in the Army for the various jobs they will 
perform. However, only four weeks of this class focus on command responsibility.
2
Within these four weeks, only two hours are focused on military justice, with a half hour 
discussion about service members’ search and seizure rights. Nothing is discussed 
addressing other affected amendments.
Third, the military’s body art policy has been gaining momentum since its 
inception. With public acceptance of body art, more and more service members are 
entering the military with body art or getting body art while in the service. Service 
members who have body art and are told to remove it, as well as service members 
prohibited from obtaining body art may become resentful.
This analysis consists of reviewing the restrictions on various military rights, 
specifically the First, Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Service members’ rights guaranteed 
by the Constitution have been severely restricted in comparison to the civilian population. 
For example, during World War II the military had the approval o f the U.S. Supreme 
Court to incarcerate civilians due to their heritage in the name of national defense. When 
civilian employees are dissatisfied with their work or supervisor they can freely express 
their opinions. However, in the military, negative comments about the military, or 
civilian or military leaders is punishable by incarceration and/or discharge (MCM, 2002). 
As long as military leaders interpret service members’ speech as a threat to good order, 
discipline or morale then the U.S. Supreme Court will, most likely, accept the restriction.
Not only is speech restricted, but so are actions. Service members do not have the 
ability to freely participate in religious exercises of their choice. Those o f the Hebrew 
faith, for example, are not permitted to wear their yarmulkes while indoors; Rastafarians 
are not permitted to wear dreadlocks; and other religious groups are prohibited from other
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activities (U.S. Army, 2003). Service members are prohibited from forming petitions to 
change the restrictions or air their grievances to the government (DoD, 1996).
What follows is a discussion of the different military justifications for restricting 
service members’ constitutional rights and the U.S. Supreme Court’s acceptance. This 
thesis culminates with a discussion on the military’s body art policy.
5Methodology
This thesis starts by identifying limitations on service members’ rights. In 
particular, this thesis reviews the following personal freedoms: the First Amendment’s 
freedom of speech, religion and the right to petition the government for redress; the Fifth 
Amendment’s due process rights; and the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury of one’s 
peers.
Next, this thesis analyzes U.S. Supreme Court cases to discern what justifications 
for military restrictions on constitutional rights the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes. By 
examining these cases this thesis identifies the most probable courses o f action for the 
military’s body art policy.
After reviewing various court cases certain justifications for restricting service 
members’ rights are evident. The U.S. Supreme Court permits restrictions on service 
members’ rights when the military can show the words or action in question compromises 
good order, discipline or morale. Another accepted justification is the need for 
uniformity. If service members exercise rights that set them apart from the rest of the 
military community, those rights may be restricted.
After identifying the accepted justifications for restricting service members’ rights 
this thesis synthesizes the case holdings to develop a comprehensive model for predicting 
whether military restrictions will be found to be constitutional, no matter which rights are 
involved. This comprehensive predictive model is then applied to the military’s 
regulations restricting body art.
Literature Review
6
Service Members Do Have Some Limited Constitutional Protections
The conflict between service members’ rights and the military has been an issue 
for over 100 years ( Dynesv. Hoover, 1858; In re Grimley, 1890). However, the debate 
over service members’ rights have become more prevalent in the past 50 years. In 1953, 
the U.S. Supreme Court heard a case dealing with constitutional rights. In this case the 
U.S. Supreme Court states that “[t]he military courts, like the state courts, have the same 
responsibilities, as do the federal courts, to protect a person from a violation of his 
constitutional rights” (Burns et al v. Wilson, 1953, p. 142). Justice Vinson, writing for 
the majority, goes on, saying:
[f]°r the constitutional guarantee of due process is meaningful enough, and 
sufficiently adaptable, to protect soldiers -  as well as civilians -  from the 
crude injustices of a trial so conducted that it becomes bent on fixing guilt 
by dispensing with rudimentary fairness rather than finding truth through 
adherence to those basic guarantees which have long been recognized and 
honored by the military courts as well as the civil courts (Burns et al v.
Wilson, 1953, p. 142-143).
Almost twenty years later, the rights of service members would again be an 
important issue. In Hollingsworth v. Balcom (1971), the U.S. Supreme Court stated that 
administrative rules and regulations must be followed in order to comply with the
requirement of basic fairness implicit in the concept of due process of law. Seaman (SN) 
Hollingsworth enlisted in the naval reserves in 1965, under a contract obligating him to 
two years o f active duty and four years of reserve duty. SN Hollingsworth then received 
dissatisfactory performance evaluations and decided to file for a discharge based on 
conscientious objector status.
The conscientious objector packet was forwarded for approval and SN 
Hollingsworth was called into his commander’s office, Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) 
Balcom. Unknown to SN Hollingsworth this interview would be used as his final 
interview for the discharge. According to the regulations SN Hollingsworth could have 
had an attorney present if he so chose. Due to LCDR Balcom’s recommendation to deny 
the discharge, the Chief of Naval Personnel notified appellant of the review board’s 
findings and advised SN Hollingsworth that his conscientious objector application was 
disapproved. The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the District Court’s and the Navy’ s 
decisions having found the Navy did not followed its administrative rules and regulations. 
LCDR Balcom failed to notify SN Hollingsworth that he could have counsel present at 
the interview ( Holingsworthv. Balcom, 1971). The Justices’ opinion concludes by
finding in favor o f SN Hollingsworth. However, the U.S. Supreme Court only ordered, 
“ ...that appellant’s conscientious objector application may be re-opened for consideration 
in accordance with the applicable Defense Department regulation...” {Hollingsworth v. 
Balcom, 1971, p. 425). Thus deferring the final decision to the Navy and the Department 
of Defense.
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In Parker v. Levy (1974), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a previous decision by 
the Court o f Military Appeals (COMA). Both courts agreed that service members 
possess some rights. The U.S. Supreme Court in Parker v. Levy, (1974) indicated that 
due to the differences between the military and civilian communities, military leaders 
require greater flexibility when dealing with military restrictions.
In 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court heard the next major case involving the 
limitations on service members’ rights in (i Chapet al v. Wallace). Chief Justice 
Warren commented in his opinion that service members’ “may not be stripped of basic 
rights simply because they have doffed their civilian clothes (304)”.
First Amendment
There is no amendment brought to trial more often than the First Amendment 
(Carr, 1999). The First Amendment’s free speech clause (DoD, 1989) has posed a unique 
challenge for military leadership and the military community (Carr, 1999). Active duty 
military members are subject to various speech restrictions imposed by the Manual for 
Courts-Martial (MCM). The military can limit the speech of its service members by any 
one or combination o f the following three avenues. The first avenues are Articles 134,
133, 92 and 88 o f the MCM (2002). The second avenues are regulations from the 
Department of Defense (DoD) and the separate services. The third and final avenue is the 
general order of military leaders.
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Similar to civilian laws, military laws can be unconstitutional if  they are over-broad. It is 
this factor under which challenges to Articles 133 and 134 have occurred.
This issue was at the heart of Parker v. Levy (1974). Captain (CPT) Levy was a 
physician stationed at Fort Jackson, South Carolina {Parker v. Levy, 1974). CPT Levy’s 
assignment was to conduct a dermatology training program for Special Forces medical 
personnel {Parker v. Levy,1974). CPT Levy made several anti-war statements to patients 
while on duty {Parker v. Levy, 1974). CPT Levy also advised several black soldiers that 
they should refuse to fight in Vietnam {Parker v. Levy, 1974). CPT Levy disobeyed a 
direct order to conduct his training and was therefore court-martialed {Parker v. Levy, 
1974). The charges were filed under Articles 90, 133 and 134 of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ) {Parker v. Levy, 1974). The courts-martial convicted CPT Levy 
and sentenced him to dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all pay and allowances and 
confinement for three years at hard labor {Parker v. Levy, 1974).
CPT Levy appealed this decision on the grounds that Articles 133 and 134 were 
over broad {Parker v. Levy, 1974). The Army Board of Military Review affirmed the 
findings and sentence {Parker v. Levy, 1974). CPT Levy then petitioned the civilian 
federal courts {Parker v. Levy, 1974). It was the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
that supported CPT Levy’s opinion and struck down both articles for over-breadth 
{Parker v. Levy, 1974).
CPT Levy’s victory was questioned as the government took the case to the U.S. 
Supreme Court {Parker v. Levy, 1974). The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Third 
Circuit, upholding Articles 133 and 134 {Parker v. Levy, 1974). In regards to the over-
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breadth argument, the U.S. Supreme Court states, conduct protected by the First 
Amendment in a civilian context can be restricted by military regulations due to the needs 
of the military ( Parkev. Levy, 1974).
Also in Parker v. Levy (1974) and on the same topic (over-breadth) the U.S. 
Supreme Court referred to their decision in United States v. Priest (1972). The U.S. 
Supreme Court identified that service members and the military mission require a 
different level o f constitutional protections (United States v. Priest, 1972). The U.S. 
Supreme Court continues to explain that the essential necessity for good order, discipline 
and its imposition necessitates a separate standard o f constitutional rights that would not 
be permissible outside military service (United States v. Priest, 1972).
Speech that is disrespectful and contemptuous or suggesting a violent change is 
acceptable in the civilian community due to the fact that it does not affect the ability of 
the government to fulfill its mission (Brandenburg v. Ohio, 1969; Parker v. Levy, 1974). 
However, the same speech in the military may affect the ability of the government to 
fulfill its mission. When considering the military, a command structure must be 
maintained in order to defend national interests against internal and external threats. This 
command structure may also require those same service members to give up their lives. 
The U.S. Supreme Court made this idea very clear stating, “[sjpeech that is protected in 
the civil population may nonetheless undermine the effectiveness o f response to 
command. If it does, it is constitutionally unprotected” (Parker v. Levy, 1974, p. 7 59 ).
The U.S. Supreme Court also states that there are relatively few plausible, 
unconstitutional applications of Articles 133 or 134 and explains that the controlling test
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is whether the articles suffered from “substantial over-breadth” (  v. Levy, 1974, p. 
760). In other words, in determining whether military restrictions of speech are specific 
enough to pass constitutional muster, only grossly overbroad provisions will be found 
unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The second clause of the First Amendment (the religious clause) prohibits the 
government from making any rules or regulations restricting religion (DoD, 1989). The 
military does not restrict service members’ religious beliefs but does restrict some 
religious practices.
The current precedent concerning religious beliefs is Goldman v. Weinberger 
(1986). CPT Goldman, an Orthodox Jew and ordained rabbi, was ordered not to wear a 
yarmulke while on duty and in uniform as a commissioned officer in the Air Force at 
March Air Force Base. This was pursuant to Air Force Regulation 35-10, Dress and 
Personal Appearance, that provides authorized headgear may be worn out of doors, but 
that indoors headgear may not be worn except by armed security police in the 
performance of their duties. CPT Goldman brought an action in Federal District Court 
claiming that the application of the regulation to prevent him from wearing his yarmulke 
infringed upon his First Amendment freedom to exercise his religious beliefs.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that restricting the yarmulke was not an 
infringement on CPT Goldman’s rights ( Goldmanv. Weinberger, 1986). The U.S. 
Supreme Court states, “[b]ut the First Amendment does not require the military to 
accommodate such practices in the face of its view that they would detract from the 
uniformity sought by the dress regulations” ( Gov. Weinberger, 1986, p. 509-510).
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The U.S. Supreme Court also holds, “ ...that those portions of the regulations challenged 
here reasonably and evenhandedly regulate dress in the interest of the military’s perceived 
need for uniformity” ( Goldmanv. Weinberger, 1986, p. 510). Continuing with Goldman
v. Weinberger, (1986) the U.S Supreme Court states: “[o]ur review o f military regulations 
challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review 
of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society” (p. 507). In Goldman v. 
Weinberger the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the standard applied by the Circuit Court of 
Appeals in its underlying decision, holding that in reviewing military regulations that 
conflict with service members constitutional rights, neither the strict scrutiny nor rational 
basis standards apply ( Goldmanv. Weinberger, 1986). Instead, the pertinent issue is
whether regulations are intended to achieve a legitimate military end and are designed to 
accommodate individual rights to an appropriate degree.
The final clause of the First Amendment is the right of citizens to petition their 
government leaders for change (DoD, 1989). DoD Directives and individual military 
service branches all restrict service members’ association with certain organizations and 
creating and circulating petitions.
The First Amendment and the Freedom of Association was examined in Orloffv. 
Willoughby (1953). At that time the arms race and fear of the communist party were in 
full swing. The U.S. was concerned with membership in the communist party and losing 
military secrets to communist governments (< Orv. Willoughby, 1953). Orloff enlisted 
in the U.S. Army as a medical specialist and was educated, at government expense, as a 
medical doctor ( Orloffv.Willoughby, 1953). Because of O rloff s refusal to disavow any
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connection with the communist party the Army denied his commission 
Willoughby, 1953). Orloff was then reassigned as a laboratory technician and assigned 
the enlisted rank of Specialist (SPC) (i O r l o f f v  Willoughby, 1953). After his training SPC 
Orloff felt that he should be awarded the commission promised in his contract {Orloffv. 
Willoughby, 1953). The military refused and SPC Orloff decided to seek judicial 
remedies {Orloff v. Willoughby, 1953). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
Court denied SPC Orloff1 s motion and stated that he was not entitled to a commission 
{Orloffv. Willoughby, 1953). Therefore, SPC Orloff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court 
that affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision indicating, “ .. .the commissioning of officers 
was a matter of discretion within the province of the President as Commander in C hief’ 
{Orloffv. Willoughby, 1953, p. 90).
Continuing in Orloff v. Willoughby the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a hands-off 
approach to the military, stating:
[b]ut judges are not given the task of running the Army.. .The military 
constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline 
from that of the civilian. Orderly government requires that the judiciary be 
as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army 
must be scrupulous not to intervene injudicial matters (1953, p. 9 3 -94 ).
Military challenges to the First Amendment’s right to petition the government for 
redress o f grievances are often accompanied by challenges to the free speech clause. The 
most prominent case in this instance is Brown v. Glines (1980). Glines was a Captain 
(CPT) stationed at Travis Air Force Base. CPT Glines drafted a petition to several
13
members of Congress and the Secretary of Defense complaining about Air Force 
grooming standards. While on temporary duty in Guam CPT Glines circulated the 
petition. When the installation commander was informed o f CPT Glines’ petition he 
immediately removed CPT Glines from active duty and placed him in the standby 
reserves {Brown v. Glines, 1980). Air Force Regulation 35-15, Dissident and Protest 
Activities, requires all Air Force personnel to acquire the installation commander’s 
approval before circulating any petitions on any installation.
CPT Glines then filed a petition that Air Force Regulation 35-15 and DoD 
Directive 1325.6, Guidelines for Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among 
Members o f  the Armed Forces, violated his First Amendment right to petition the 
government for redress of grievances. The Northern District Court of California and the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted summary judgment for CPT Glines against 
Secretary of Defense Brown. In Brown v. Glines (1980) the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that Air Force Regulation 35-15, and Directive 1325.6, were permissible under the First 
Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court found the challenged regulation protected a 
substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of free speech and the right 
to petition {Brown v. Glines, 1980). Brown v. Glines (1980) signified that the 
government interest was unrelated to the suppression of free speech. The U.S. Supreme 
Court indicated that if the government interest is actually the suppression of speech and 
ideas then a different standard would apply {Brown v. Glines, 1980). In this case the 
government interest was to avoid disruption of military missions and to maintain loyalty, 
discipline and morale, not to suppress the dissemination of ideas.
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The U.S. Supreme Court also held in Brown v. Glines (1980) that United States 
Code 10, provides the proper procedures to address problems within the military and 
Congress. The U.S. Supreme Court found that a petition without permission is not 
constitutionally protected as if service members were members o f the civilian population. 
The concern for disrupting the military mission and the possibility of creating a clear and 
present danger to the loyalty, discipline and morale of service members must take 
precedence over service members’ rights to petition {Brown v. 1980). In other
words, the general standard applied to civilian circumstances is that speech cannot be 
quashed unless the speech represents a clear and present danger. The standard that Brown 
v. Glines (1980) applies to military circumstances is that speech cannot be quashed unless 
the speech “possibly creates” a clear and present danger. Brown v. Glines (1980) cites 
Greer v. Spock (1976) where the U.S. Supreme Court states, “[t]here is nothing in the 
Constitution that disables a military commander from acting to avert what he perceives to 
be a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops on the base under his 
command (p. 353)”
Fifth Amendment
When dealing with cases in which service members claim their Fifth Amendment 
rights have been violated by the military the U.S. Supreme Court has regularly held in 
favor of the military. The U.S. Supreme Court has shown deference to the military 
judicial system’s determinations. The U.S. Supreme Court has alluded to the civilian
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court’s lack of expertise to review prosecutions based upon military customs (Robbins, 
1999).
An early example in which the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the Fifth 
Amendment was Hirabayashi v. United States (1943). This is important because the case 
is based upon a claim that military action restricted the defendant’s Fifth Amendment due 
process rights. In Chief Justice Stone’s opinion he stated for the U.S. Supreme Court that 
neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor any other court should sit in review of the wisdom of 
the military when it comes to matters of making war and defending national interests 
against internal and external threats (Hirabayashi v. United States, 1943). Justice Stone 
goes on to state, in the majority opinion, that the U.S. Supreme Court cannot reject the 
judgment of military leaders and of Congress. The U.S. Supreme Court noted that courts 
are not in any position to discredit the military when it makes an educated calculation to 
the defense of the nation and the prompt and adequate measures that must be taken to 
preserve the country’s safety (Hirabayashi v. United States, 1943).
To support the U.S. Supreme Court’s deference to the military and continuing to 
support the idea that the military knows what is best when it comes to national defense 
and themselves, Justice Stone states, “[i]n this case it is enough that circumstances within 
the knowledge of those charged with the responsibility for maintaining the national 
defense afforded a rational basis for the decision which they made. Whether we would 
have made it is irrelevant” {Hirabayashi v. United States, 1943, p. 102).
Shortly after Hirabayashi v. United States (1943), the U.S. Supreme Court again 
considered the Fifth Amendment and the due process clause. The next case was
16
Korematsu v. United States (1944). At the onset of World War II in 1941, the 
government issued Executive Order 9066, ordering all U.S. citizens and legalized aliens 
with Japanese ancestry (service members and civilians alike) in west coast military areas 
to remain in their residences from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m. daily ( v. United States,
1944). The curfew was designed as a protection against espionage and sabotage 
( Korematsuv. United States, 1944). On March 21, 1942, Congress enacted Civilian 
Exclusion Order 34, to replace Executive Order 9066. This new order required all 
persons of Japanese ancestry, over 100,000 people ( v. United States, 1944), to
remove themselves from military areas on the west coast and go anywhere else or report 
to detention camps (Robbins, 1999). This order was issued by the President and had a 
congressional sanction allowing the military to handle the internal defense of the nation 
{Korematsu v. United States, 1944). Regardless of civilians’ status, if  they were within 
750 miles of the Pacific Coast they had to leave the area or face internment {Korematsu v. 
United States, 1944). The government did not dictate these citizens where to go as long 
as they relocated at least 750 miles away from the coast {Korematsu v. United States, 
1944). Mr. Korematsu, a Japanese-American citizen living in San Leandro, CA, was 
convicted of violating Civilian Exclusion Order 34, by the commanding general of the 
Western Command, U.S. Army {Korematsu v. United States, 1944). Mr. Korematsu 
challenged the constitutionality of the order and in a six to three vote the U.S. Supreme 
Court upheld his conviction {Korematsu v. United States, 1944). The opinion of the court 
noted:
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.. .all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group 
are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are 
unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most 
rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the 
existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can ( v.
United States, 1944, p. 216.
To justify it’s holding the U.S. Supreme Court states that, “ ...military authorities, charged 
with the primary responsibility of defending our shores, concluded the curfew provided 
inadequate protection and ordered exclusion” (Korematsu v. United States, 1944, p. 218). 
This demonstrates that when circumstances are such that the U.S Supreme Court is 
willing to accept, uncritically, the government’s description of the magnitude of military 
need, actions might be permitted restricting individual freedoms in a grievous manner 
(Warren, 1962). Mr. Korematsu was interred in a camp outside of Topaz, UT from May 
1942, to December 1944 (http://www.vw.cc.va.us/vwhansd/HIS122/Korematsu.html,
2003). The Korematsu v. United States (1944) case has never been overruled in the past 
fifty-nine years (Robbins, 1999). Most critics believe this case represents the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s deference to the military at its worst and sets a dangerous precedent 
(Robbins, 1999). The dissenting opinions in Korematsu v. United States (1944) state:
[a] judicial construction of the due process clause that will sustain this 
order is a far more subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation of the 
order itself. A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last 
longer than the military emergency... But once a judicial opinion
18
rationalized such an order to show that it conforms to the Constitution, or 
rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions 
such an order, the Court for all time has validated the principle of racial 
discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American 
Citizens (p. 246).
Even though the military has never again faced the dilemma of transplanting U.S. 
citizens, nor has the U.S. Supreme Court used this ruling for modem Fifth Amendment 
cases, there is fear that the pattern of analysis used in this case still continues (Robbins, 
1999). Korematsu v. United States (1944) demonstrates how the U.S. Supreme Court 
accepts certain military restrictions created by Congress (Robbins, 1999). The U.S. 
Supreme Court has allowed Congress to balance civil rights and the needs of the armed 
forces by deferring military justice matters to the military.
In Burns et al v. Wilson (1953), defendants were tried separately by courts-martial 
and found guilty of murder and rape and sentenced to death {Burns et al v. 1953).
After exhausting all remedies available to them under the Revised Articles of War, 62 
Stat. 627, the petitioners applied to a Federal District Court for writs of habeas corpus, 
alleging they had been denied due process o f law in the proceedings leading to their 
convictions by the courts-martial {Burns et al v. Wilson, 1953). The respondents denied 
these allegations and attached to their answer copies of the records o f the trials and of all 
proceedings by the military reviewing authorities, which showed plainly that the military 
courts had heard petitioners on every significant allegation urged before the District Court 
{Burns et al v. Wilson, 1953). After satisfying itself that the courts-martial had complete
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jurisdiction, the District Court dismissed the applications without hearing evidence and 
without further review ( B u m s e t  al v. Wilson, 1953). The Court of Appeals gave the 
petitioners' allegations full consideration on their merits, reviewed the evidence in the 
record of the trial and other proceedings before the military courts and affirmed ( et 
al v. Wilson, 1953). The U.S. Supreme Court accepted the case and after hearing the 
evidence, indicated that courts-martial proceedings could be challenged through habeas 
corpus actions brought in civil courts only if those proceedings had denied service 
members their fundamental rights and could only address de novo issues and not issues 
already decided by courts-martial ( Burns et al v. Wilson, 1953). In other words, it is 
inappropriate for civilian courts to accept jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions with 
regard to issues and claims already considered by the military courts.
The U.S. Supreme Court clearly delineated their purpose in reviewing courts- 
martial proceedings when they stated:
...the military courts have heard petitioners out on every significant 
allegation which they now urge. Accordingly, it is not the duty of the civil 
courts simply to repeat that process — to reexamine and reweigh each item 
of evidence o f the occurrence of events which tend to prove or disprove 
one of the allegations in the applications for habeas corpus. It is the 
limited function of the civil courts to determine whether the military have 
given fair consideration to each of these claims ( et al v. Wilson,
1953, p. 144).
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Besides addressing the First Amendment, Parker and Levy (1974) addressed the 
Fifth Amendment. Specifically, Parker claimed that Articles 133 and 134 were vague in 
nature. The U.S. Supreme Court disposed of the vagueness question by stressing that the 
military community’s uniqueness warranted the use of a lower standard of testing in 
regards to the vagueness of military penal statutes. In Parker v. Levy (1974), the U.S. 
Supreme Court cited lower court opinions that held the applications of military custom 
are best determined by military officers who are more competent judges than the courts of 
common law. Justice Rehnquist, in the majority opinion for Parker v. Levy (1974) stated 
that it “has long recognized that the military is, by necessity, a specialized society 
separate from civilian society” (p. 743). Rehnquist goes on to say, “[a]n army is not a 
deliberative body. It is the executive arm. Its law is that of obedience. No question can 
be left open as to the right to command in the officer or the duty of obedience in the 
soldier” (Parker v. Levy, 1974, p. 744). The U.S. Supreme Court permits some 
restrictions on service members’ due process rights due to the uniqueness of the military 
community.
In the majority opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court states, “[bjecause of the factors 
differentiating military society from civilian society, we hold that the proper standard of 
review for a vagueness challenge to the articles of the Code is the standard which applies 
to criminal statutes regulating economic affairs” (Parker v. Levy, 1974, p. 756). The U.S. 
Supreme Court indicates that Articles 133 and 134 met this standard (Parker v. Levy, 
1974). To expand on what the U.S. Supreme Court considered vague the Supreme Court 
continued:
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[v]oid for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not 
attach where one could not reasonably understand that his contemplated 
conduct is proscribed. In determining the sufficiency of the notice a statute 
must of necessity be examined in the light o f the conduct with which a 
defendant is charged {Parker v. Levy, 1974, p. 757).
Sixth Amendment
The military justice system and MCM vary from civilian Sixth Amendment rights 
in one major way. The difference is with regard to the process of selecting a jury or, as 
jurists are known in the military, court members.
In the military the convening authority is required by the MCM to select as court 
members “such members of the armed forces as, in his opinion, are best qualified for the 
duty by reason of age, education, training, experience, length o f service and judicial 
temperament” (MCM, 2002, p. A2-7). Initially the convening authority may only select 
officers for the court member board. However, if the accused is an enlisted member and 
requests, in writing, for enlisted members to sit on the board then up to one-third of the 
members may be enlisted (MCM, 2002). The accused may be convicted on the vote of as 
few as two-thirds of the members (MCM, 2002) with as few as three members in a 
special courts-martial (MCM, 2002).
COMA/CAAF have upheld this process as “a reasonable means of assisting the 
convening authority, provided it does not improperly exclude service members” {United
States v. Roland, 1998, p. 69). Similar to the civilian sector, the convening authority may 
not use a court member who is the accuser, a witness for the prosecution or an individual 
who acted as investigating officer or as counsel in the same case (MCM, 2002). When it 
can be avoided court members are not permitted to be of lower rank or grade of the 
accused (MCM, 2002). Convening authorities cannot influence the outcome of boards by 
appointing biased service members to achieve a guilty verdict {United States v.
1998; United States v. Smith, 1988).
While service members are not entitled to panels composed of a cross-section of 
the military community {United States v. Lewis, 1997), court members may not be 
selected solely on the basis of their rank {United States v. Nixon, 1991). Thus, while it is 
permissible to appoint senior, qualified court members {United States v. White, 1998) the 
lower grades may not be systematically excluded {United States v. Roland, 1999, quoting 
United States v. McClain, 1986).
In United States v. Roland (1999), CAAF granted a broad discovery and 
compulsory process to facilitate the accused’s ability to challenge the composition o f the 
court and the selection process (Young, 2000). In United States v. Roland (1999), CAAF 
identified that once the defense makes a showing that members were improperly selected 
the prosecution must show that no impropriety occurred in the selection process. The 
MCM also allows the accused to have court members questioned in regards to their 
suitability to sit on the court (2002). Normally both plaintiff and defendant counsels do 
this, however, the MCM does permit military judges to conduct the examination 
themselves (2002). Although military judges have wide discretion in ruling on challenges
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for cause, CAAF stated in United States v. White (1993) that these challenges must be 
granted liberally (Young, 2000).
The court member selection process for courts-martial is described in thorough 
detail in Part II, Chapter V, of the MCM (2002). It is the responsibility of the convening 
authorities to select potential court members (MCM, 2002). After a list is created 
convening authorities distribute copies of the list and the personnel files of each 
suggested member to the defense attorneys (MCM, 2002). Just like the civilian justice 
system the military justice system allows voir dire and the removal of court members 
(MCM, 2002).
The U.S. Supreme Court has deferred the design of the court member selection 
process to the military and the MCM. This was discussed as early as 1866, in Ex parte 
Milligan where the U.S. Supreme Court states:
[t]he discipline necessary to the efficiency of the army and navy, required 
other and swifter modes of trial than are furnished by the common law 
courts; and, in pursuance of the power conferred by the Constitution,
Congress has declared the kinds of trial, and the manner in which they 
shall be conducted, for offences committed while the party is in the 
military or naval service. Every one connected with these branches of the 
public service is amenable to the jurisdiction which Congress has created 
for their government, and, while thus serving, surrenders his right to be 
tried by the civil courts (p. 123).
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In United States v. Solorio (1986), dissenting Justice Marshall confirmed that the 
attitude of the U.S. Supreme Court is that: “[t]he rights to grand jury process and to trial 
by jury are, of course, of restricted application in military cases” (p. 453). However, in 
the military justice system this process has been specifically tested in the COMA/CAAF 
{United States v. Kemp, 1973; United States v.Roland, 1999; v. McClain, 
1986). The U.S Supreme Court has reviewed the courts-martial process and has accorded 
Congress considerable deference (Weiss v. United States, 1976). In United States v.
Kemp (1973), COMA stated that:
[cjourts-martial are not a part of the judiciary of the United States within 
the meaning of Article III of the Constitution. They derive their authority 
from the enactments of Congress under Article I of the Constitution, 
pursuant to congressional power to make rules for the government of the 
land and naval forces. Consequently, the Sixth Amendment right to trial 
by jury with accompanying considerations of constitutional means by 
which juries may be selected has no application to the appointment of 
members o f courts-martial (p. 154).
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Discussion 
The Separate Standard
The U.S. Supreme Court has identified that enlisting or accepting a commission 
into the military creates for service members a status with different rights and duties 
unknown to the civilian community. Since the U. S. Supreme Court has allowed 
limitations on service members’ First, Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights it is important 
to understand why the military is permitted this leniency. There are four primary reasons 
given by the military for limiting service members’ rights. The first reason given is that 
the military requires a special discipline and order to perform its missions. The second 
reason given is uniformity. The military has a long history based of uniformity 
facilitating discipline and order. The third reason given is that the military is a separate 
community from the civilian community and this separate community requires special 
rules and regulations that most citizens would not be willing to accept in the civilian 
community. The fourth reason given is that of deference. The deference accorded by the 
U.S. Supreme Court to military leaders is with regard to judgment. Rather than invoke its 
judgment as to the necessity of a particular restriction or to the necessity of a 
characteristic such as uniformity, the U.S. Supreme Court defers to military leaders’ 
judgment as to the necessity.
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Good Order, Discipline and Morale
One of the oldest, and a primary, reason the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a 
hands-off policy with regard to the military is the military’s need for discipline and order. 
The discipline to obey orders is a major difference between the military community and 
the civilian community. Most o f the restrictions on service members’ rights cite 
discipline as one o f the primary reasons for the restrictions. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
been very receptive to discipline as a justification for the restriction of service members’ 
rights.
The U.S. Supreme Court has noted, in regards to the First Amendment’s right to 
free speech, the military is not a deliberative body; the obedience of service members to 
the command of their superiors is required ( Pav. Levy, 1974). The “military’s law is 
that of obedience” (In re Grimley, 1890). There must be no question as to who is in 
charge; obedience is necessary for the success of the military (In re Grimley, 1890). The 
military’s primary function is to defend national interests against internal and external 
threats (Parker v. Levy, 1974). At times service members may be called upon to follow 
commands placing their lives at risk and unfaltering obedience is required (United States 
exrel. Tothv. Quarles, 1955).
The U.S. Supreme Court and the military courts have authorized military leaders 
broad disciplinary power over statements made by service members not wanting to fight 
when called upon to (Parker v. Levy, 1974; Untied States v. Priest, 1972). The U.S.
Supreme Court specifically stated that any public and direct statements by service 
members to desert or disobey orders may be punished ( v. Levy, 1974). Both the
civilian and military courts feel that the danger to present or future military discipline is 
one of the most important factors when deciding to limit the rights of service members 
( Parkerv. Levy, 1974). It is important for service members to fight when military 
leadership determines it is necessary.
When specifically examining restrictions on speech the U.S. Supreme Court has 
identified that not only are direct statements to disobey or desert considered a threat to 
good order and discipline, but so are disloyal statements. Disloyal statements consist of 
(but are not limited to) service members denigrating the democracy of the United States, 
discrediting the civilian leaders of the military or praising the enemy ( v. Levy,
1974).
Speech by service members does not have to be verbal but may also be in the form 
of petitions. The First Amendment’s right to petition has also found limitations within 
the military. In the name of discipline, service members are restricted from creating and 
circulating petitions. The U.S. Supreme Court on numerous occasions has accepted the 
argument that military regulations restricting petitions have the interest of maintaining the 
respect for duty and discipline, which is more vital to military effectiveness ( v. 
Spock, 1976; Brown v. Glines, 1980)
Even judicial opponents to the military and the separate standards have rarely 
criticized obedience. Justice Douglas stated “ .. .military by tradition and by necessity 
demands discipline” ( Parkerv. Levy, 1974). Discipline is crucial to the success of the
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military. Military leaders from General Washington and the Continental Army to present 
day have stressed that discipline is the backbone of the military. Shortly after Desert 
Storm the top two generals in the U.S. military made statements about discipline and unit 
cohesion. General Colin Powell said:
We create cohesive teams of warriors who will bond so tightly that they 
are prepared to go into battle and give their lives if necessary for the 
accomplishment of the mission and for the cohesion of the group and for 
their individual buddies. We cannot allow anything to happen which 
would disrupt that feeling of cohesion within the force (Carr, 1998, p.
326).
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf said: “ ...in my forty years o f army service in three 
different wars, I have become convinced that unit cohesion is the single most important 
factor in a unit’s ability to succeed on the battlefield” (Carr, 1998, p. 326).
The U.S. Supreme Court has identified that there is a need for special regulations 
in relation to military discipline {Chappell et al v. Wallace, 1983). Supporting the need 
for discipline, the U.S. Supreme Court has accepted the fact that the military cannot 
function without strict discipline and regulations that would be unacceptable in civilian 
settings {Chappell et al v. Wallace, 1983). The U.S. Supreme Court states that 
restrictions are necessary for the maintenance of basic discipline and preparedness of the 
military {United States, Schneider v. Laird, 1972). The U.S. Supreme Court has strongly 
supported the opinion that the military depends on a leadership structure that at times 
must commit service members to combat.
29
In conjunction with good order and discipline is morale. The U.S. Supreme Court 
has identified that First Amendment rights may be restricted if the speech or publication 
affects morale. Regardless o f the status of service members, whether they are basic 
training recruits or seasoned veterans, the morale of service members and units is of great 
importance ( Orlofv. Wiloughby, 1953; Greer v. Spock, 1976). The U.S. Supreme Court 
has stated that the determining factor for morale is the perception of military leaders. If 
military leaders feel information has a possibility of being a clear and present danger to 
loyalty, discipline or morale then the First Amendment may be restricted ( v.
Glines, 1980).
Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court have found that the unique nature of the 
military requires civilian courts to permit military leaders some flexibility in dealing with 
matters that affect internal discipline and morale (Middendorf v. Henry, 1976).
Morale has been argued to justify not restricting service members’ rights 
(Goldman v. Weinberger, 1986). However, this attempt was unsuccessful with the U.S. 
Supreme Court which found that this argument was not justifiable to override the 
military’s need for discipline and uniformity (Goldman v. Weinberger, 1986).
Uniformity
In conjunction with discipline and unit cohesion, the military relies heavily on 
uniformity. In the eyes of the U.S. Supreme Court the concept of uniformity 
encompasses two dimensions. The first concept is the importance of uniformity in dress
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and appearances {Goldman v. Weinberger, 1986). The second concept is the equal 
treatment of service members and not permitting a group within the military have special 
considerations that other groups within the military do not {Goldman v. Weinberger, 
1986).
There are military regulations specifically stating what service members’ uniform 
are to be made of, how service members are to wear uniforms and what can and cannot be 
put onto uniforms. Uniformity not only pertains to uniforms, but also to every aspect of 
service members’ lives. Items like what time service members get up, do physical 
training, eat lunch and go home.
The U.S. Supreme has recognized the importance uniformity plays in the military 
{Goldman v. Weinberger, 1986). Even though many individuals in the civilian 
community cannot understand how important uniformity is, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
recognized that service members’ rights may be limited to maintain uniformity {Goldman 
v. Weinberger, 1986). The U.S. Supreme Court has accepted arguments by military 
leaders that uniformity must be maintained for the sake of the services {Goldman v. 
Weinberger, 1986).
Uniformity has been deemed necessary by the military to support good order, 
discipline and morale. The military is not an individual profession. It takes a team effort 
to defend national interests both foreign and domestic. Therefore, the military places 
high value on that teamwork. By ensuring that military members train, dress and perform 
as a team, the military is setting a standard for success. When service members are 
permitted to break away from the required uniformity the military loses its team attitude
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and riffs start to form, which ultimately can destroy the military’s good order, discipline 
and morale.
In conjunction with uniformity of looks and appearance the U.S. Supreme Court 
has recognized that there is another dimension to uniformity. This second dimension is 
that treatment of all service members must be uniform across the branches ( v.
Weinberger, 1986). Even though the U.S. Supreme Court will allow some differences 
based on the distinctions between the services, within a service all sailors, airmen, 
soldiers or marines must be treated equally ( Gv. Weinberger, 1986).
Separate Community
An equally important and long-standing justification for the limitation on service 
members rights accepted by the U.S. Supreme Court is the military comprises a separate 
community. In the U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 12, grants Congress the 
power to “raise and support Armies”; Clause 13, authorizes Congress to “provide and 
maintain a Navy”; and Clause 14, confers to Congress the power “to make Rules for the 
Government and Regulations of the land and naval forces” (DoD, 1989, p. 7). The U.S. 
Supreme Court has recognized that the unique military mission and responsibilities are 
the foundation upon which the separate community rationale is justified (
Willoughby, 1953). The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that Congress has given the 
military justice system the jurisdiction to handle their own cases and that the U.S.
Supreme Court should not interfere with this jurisdiction unless under extreme 
circumstances (Orloff v. Willoughby, 1954).
The U.S. Supreme Court has refrained from interfering with the day-to-day 
operations of the military. For over 100 years the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that 
it is not the job of judges to run the military and that the military is a separate community 
requiring a separate discipline from the civilian community (i . Willoughby, 1954).
The U.S. Supreme Court and the military courts have often justified their 
decisions on the basis that the unique nature of the military has created a separate 
community necessitating different applications of service members’ rights ( v.
Levy, 1974). When discussing the military as a separate community, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has stated that they have long recognized the military as a specialized society 
separate from civilian society ( . Parkev. Levy, 1974). This separate community is not by 
choice but by necessity because the job of the military is to defend national interests 
against internal and external threats and if the occasion arises, to fight wars ( v. 
Levy, 1974).
There are some protections in the Bill of Rights that are specifically denied 
service members. For example, the Fifth Amendment’s Grand Jury provision contains 
exceptions if the courts-martial arises in the land or naval forces. Supporting the 
difference between the military’s courts-martial and civilian courts, the U.S. Supreme 
Court identified that service members have never been subject to the jury-trial demands 
of Article III of the Constitution (Ex parte Milligan, 1866).
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Almost 90 years later the U.S. Supreme Court continued to identify the difference 
between the two communities. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that there are 
two separate judicial systems when considering the military: one court system for 
civilians and one court system for military service members {Burns al v. Wilson, 1953).
The U.S. Supreme Court has identified the military as a separate community from 
the rest of society that requires different norms {Parker v. Levy, 1974). Regardless of 
when service members violate the UCMJ the importance of the military must be 
considered. This idea was expanded on after Parker v. Levy (1974), when the U.S. 
Supreme Court expanded deference from wartime issues to peacetime issues {Brown v. 
Glines, 1980).
The military courts have used the separate community standard to support 
separate Fourth Amendment search and seizure standards. The courts have accepted that 
reasonable expectations of privacy within the military are different from those in the 
civilian community {United States v. McCarthy, 1993).
Even though the U.S. Supreme Court has identified the military as a separate 
community, the U.S. Supreme Court has not conceded that the separate military 
community completely negates the rights of service members. The U.S. Supreme Court 
has recognized that U.S. citizens that choose to join the military may not be stripped of 
basic rights simply because they have become service members {Chappell et al v.
Wallace, 1983).
The U.S. Supreme Court has identified the difference between the military 
community and civilian community as one simple principle. The military and civilian
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communities differ due to the fact that it is the primary business o f the military to fight or 
be ready to fight wars whenever the situation warrants {United States ex rel. Toth v. 
Quarles, 1955; Parker v. Levy, 1974). The role of the military was again discussed in 
Brown v. Glines (1980), where the U.S. Supreme Court indicates that the special dangers 
present in the military’s mission might warrant different restrictions on the rights of 
service members. With the possibility of an internal or external threat to national security 
looming at any given time and the need to be ready, it can be anticipated that when 
service members’ rights and the military’s role come into conflict, the service members’ 
rights would be restricted.
Deference
Deference goes hand-in-hand with discipline and the separate community 
standard. Just as old as the discipline and separate community arguments, deference has 
been raised in the U.S. Supreme Court since the beginning of our nation {Dynes v.
Hoover, 1858). The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently ruled in favor of the limitations 
of service members’ rights that the military believes are necessary.
The U.S. Supreme Court made their opinion on deference most evident during 
World War II. In two landmark cases the U.S. Supreme Court showed that they relied on 
a hands-off policy with regard to the military and the military’s exercise of discretion
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and judgment; especially when the situation deals with the security of the country 
(Hirabayashi v. United States, 1943; Korematsuv. United States, 1944).
Ten years after the Korematsu v. United States (1944) ruling the U.S. Supreme 
Court would continue the decision to defer military matters back to the military. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has identified that for the proper function of an orderly government 
the judiciary must not interfere with legitimate military matters and the military must not 
intervene with judicial matters ( Orlofv. Willoughby, 1954).
The U.S. Supreme Court has identified that there are special circumstances 
surrounding military governance. These special circumstances require that such cases be 
kept within the internal administrative grievance process subject to judicial review only 
through the Court of Military Appeals (COMA) ( et al v. Wallace, 1983).
Deference has continued to surface in more recent court cases regarding various 
service members’ rights. The U.S. Supreme Court has maintained its rulings from 
decades before and states: “ ...courts must give great deference to the professional 
judgment of military authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular 
military interest” {Goldman v. Weinberger, 1986).
At the core of the civilian courts’ lack to venture into the military leadership and 
judicial system is the fear that civilian courts lack the competence to contradict military 
experts’ judgment (Warren, 1962). The U.S. Supreme Court’s deference is based upon 
the historical tradition that the military establishment has enough broad power to deal 
with its own. Justice Warren has stated, in a separate article, that one of the most obvious
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reasons for the courts’ deference is that the courts are ill equipped to determine the impact 
upon discipline that any intrusion may have upon discipline (1962).
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently maintained deference when considering 
cases that permit military institutions to make their own evaluations of the requirements 
of discipline. This is not to say that every case considering the military and the civil 
liberties of service members is deferred to the military’s standard, but it does identify that 
the U.S. Supreme Court is more willing to defer when a legitimate military interest is 
being sought.
Application Towards the Body Art Policy
One of the largest and most recent challenges against the First Amendment’s 
freedom of speech is body art. Military members have had tattoos for as long as tattooing 
has existed. Sailors would typically get the Navy anchor placed on their bodies, Marines 
would usually portray the bulldog or globe and anchor and, Army soldiers would 
normally depict their unit symbol. It is this expression of individuality that has led to 
various body art policies. As of today the DoD has not issued a body art directive. 
However, each branch of the military has its own policy on body art.
For all branches of the military, gang or hate group related symbols are not 
authorized anywhere on the body. These marks are searched for during service members’
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pre-entry and entry physicals and every five years subsequently. Currently, only the Air 
Force and Navy have regulations against body mutilations, such as tongue bifurcation.
Body art typically has two meanings, first to the person getting the body art and 
second to those who see it (Campanella, 1999). It is the latter meaning that directly 
affects the military and its leaders. Military leaders are responsible for the morale and 
welfare of their entire unit(s). If individual members of units interpret body art as 
offensive or inappropriate it may have a negative effect throughout those units. On the 
other hand, there are many service members who feel body art policies are 
unconstitutional and limit their right to free speech (Campanella, 1999).
The first service branch to issue an official body art policy was the Marine Corps 
(All Marines [ALMAR] Message 194,1996) (see appendix A). The Marine policy 
prohibits any member from having any body piercing while on or off duty (ALMAR 
Message 194, 1996). The only exception to this policy is women may wear one earring in 
each ear when they are in certain uniforms or off duty. The Marine policy also prohibits 
tattoos or brands on the hands, neck or head. Tattoos or brands that are prejudicial to 
good order and discipline or bring discredit to the Marine Corps are forbidden anywhere 
on the body (ALMAR Message 194, 1996).
The second service to issue an official body art policy was the Army. The Army’s 
body art policy prohibits any member (including academy cadets) from wearing anything 
through the skin while on duty or in civilian clothes off duty on any military installation 
(Army Regulation [AR] 670-1, 2003) (see appendix B). The only exception to this policy 
is women may wear one earring in each ear while in certain uniforms or off duty. The
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Army’s policy on tattoos and brands is the same as the Marine policy: the mark(s) may 
not be visible on the hands, neck or head (AR 670-1, 2003). Tattoos or brands also may 
not be visible or detract from a soldierly appearance while wearing the dress uniform (AR 
670-1, 2003). The Army has not specified what is considered an inappropriate tattoo or 
brand; this is left it up to military leaders to determine (Campanella, 1999).
Shortly following the Army’s body art policy was the Air Force body art policy. 
The Air Force’s body art policy stems from Air Force Instruction (AFI) 36-2903 (2002) 
(see appendix C), which allows Air Force members (including academy cadets) to wear 
unexposed body piercings in uniform or civilian attire, on or off installation. Women are 
authorized to wear one earring in each ear while in all duty uniforms or off duty. The Air 
Force does, however, identify two prohibited body art categories: unauthorized and 
inappropriate (U.S. Department of the Air Force, 2002). Unauthorized marks are defined 
as those that are obscene; advocate sexual, racial, ethnic or religious discrimination; bring 
discredit to the Air Force; or are prejudicial to good order and discipline (U.S.
Department of the Air Force, 2002). Inappropriate marks are defined as those above the 
collarbone or exceeding one-fourth of the exposed body while in uniform (U.S. 
Department of the Air Force, 2002).
The most recent DoD branch to issue a body art policy is the Navy. The Navy’s 
body art policy prohibits its members (including midshipmen) from wearing body 
piercings while in uniform or while on an installation or aboard a ship or aircraft. Like 
the other military branches, women are authorized to wear one earring in each ear on duty 
in some uniforms or off duty. The Naval policy also allows for off-duty, off installation
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wear of body piercings as long as the member is not participating in any military 
recreational activities (U.S. Department of the Navy, 1999) (see appendix D). The 
Navy’s tattoo policy is considered the most lenient of all branches. The Naval policy 
prohibits tattoos depicting controlled substances or advocating drug abuse at any time on 
any military installation (U.S. Department of the Navy, 1999). Up until recently, there 
was no policy in Naval regulations addressing racial or other types of offensive tattoos 
(U.S. Department of the Navy, 1999). On January 30, 2003, the Chief of Naval 
Operations issued a letter stating:
...tattoos/body art/brands that are excessive, obscene, sexually explicit or 
advocate or symbolize sex, gender, racial, religious, ethnic or national 
origin discrimination are prohibited. In addition, tattoos/body art/brands 
that advocate or symbolize gang affiliation, supremacist or extremist 
groups, or drug use are prohibited (Chief of Naval Operations, p. 2).
In this letter the Navy became the second branch to prohibit body mutilations.
Though they now fall under the Department of Homeland Security the Coast 
Guard also issued a body art policy. The Coast Guard’s body art policy is similar to the 
Marine Corps’ and Army’s in that it does not permit its members to have mark(s) on the 
head or neck. The Commandant’s letter (Commandant Instruction [COMDTINST]
M l020.6) (see appendix E) states that any markings that are contrary to the basic core 
values of the Coast Guard; prejudicial to good order and discipline or morale; or of a 
nature to bring discredit upon the Coast Guard are prohibited (U.S. Department of 
Transportation [DOT], 2003). This manual also covers body piercings (same as body
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mutilations) and is equivalent to the Army’s: no service members are authorized to wear 
piercings in uniform or civilian clothing while on a military installation. The only 
exception to this is women are authorized to wear one earring in each ear at any time in 
all uniforms, on or off duty (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2003).
With the constant changes in body art policies service members have not been 
punished under these policies. However, with an increased emphasis on military 
leadership buckling down on gang-related and hate tattoos future punishment is 
something bound to occur. The question is, how will the military and federal courts deal 
with these policies?
It is apparent from the case law discussed above that the military’ s restrictions on 
body art can be justified as necessary to maintain order and discipline. The effect that 
visible displays o f gangs or hate groups have on individual service members would 
negatively effect good order, discipline and morale.
In order for the government to quash speech in the civilian context, the 
government must demonstrate a clear and present danger is represented by the speech. In 
a military context all that needs be demonstrated is the possibility of the speech creating a 
clear and present danger. Since some forms of body art may portray a clear and present 
danger to the good order, discipline and morale of the military, the U.S. Supreme Court 
will permit their restriction. As discussed in Greer v. Spock (1976), the U.S. Supreme 
Court has identified that military leaders have the responsibility and duty to avert what 
they perceive to be clear dangers to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of service members.
41
It is also apparent that the restrictions on body art can be justified due to the need 
for uniformity. Uniformity has been incorporated as a necessity for the maintenance of 
good order, discipline and morale in the military. Without uniformity there would be no 
limitation to the appearance of service members. The loss of uniformity would degrade 
the team-building concept and erode a unit’s good order, discipline and morale.
The precedent set in Orloff v. Willoughby (1953) to maintain a hands-off policy 
would continue with future body art cases. The U.S. Supreme Court has identified that 
they do not have the expertise and knowledge to deal with the impact of permitting body 
art in the military and would defer the case back to the military’s judgment. This policy 
o f deference was evident in Goldman v. Weinberger (1986), which dealt with the wearing 
of religious apparel. Even though the wearing of a yarmulke is considered a religious 
necessity for the Hebrew faith, the U.S. Supreme Court deferred the case back to the 
judgment of the military and the need for uniformity. Body art, similar to religious 
apparel, is at the preference of service members. There is no significant freedom being 
quashed simply due to the fact that service members cannot pierce, tattoo or brand certain 
parts of their bodies.
When considering body art policies the U.S. Supreme Court will not review 
individual specific types, such as tattoos, piercings, brandings, etc. In the eyes of the 
military all of the above are considered body art and that is what the U.S. Supreme Court 
will consider as a whole. Some service members will claim that their piercings are 
hidden by clothing and should therefore be permitted. Service members will claim that
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by not permitting service members to wear concealed piercings, the military is infringing 
on their constitutional right to free speech.
Since the military has argued that piercings are a violation of Articles 133 and 134 
of the UCMJ, service members have a difficult time proving there is an infringement on 
their rights. Senior military leaders have deemed that piercings are not becoming of 
officers, nor do piercings represent a soldierly appearance.
There are two main reasons the military will prevail over service members’ right 
to free speech and the U.S. Supreme Court will rule in favor of the military leaders. First, 
as the U.S. Supreme Court determined in Parker v. Levy (1974), there are relatively few 
plausible, unconstitutional applications of Articles 133 and 134. For either Article 133 or 
134, to be determined over-broad would require the regulations to be o f “substantial over­
breadth” (  Parkev. Levy, 1974, p. 760). The U.S. Supreme Court would approve the 
military’s opinion that body piercings are not becoming to the image the military wants to 
portray. The U.S. Supreme Court would defer the matter back to military leaders and 
their judgment.
The second main reason the military would prevail over concealed body piercings 
is that piercings, whether they are covered or removed or not, may pose a risk to good 
order, discipline and morale. For service members living in barracks piercings may be 
seen at any time during off-duty hours. For example, male service members walking to 
the showers with their shirts off, hanging out in their barracks rooms, etc. Other service 
members’ impressions are a valid concern.
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Concealed body piercings are also a valid health concern. The mission of the 
military is to defend national interests, both foreign and domestic. As was seen by the 3rd 
Infantry Division in December 2002, the call can come at any time to deploy to a third 
world country. Service members may be required to go without showers for extended 
periods of time. This unclean environment is dangerous for healthy skin, let alone for 
punctures in the skin caused by piercings, whether they are covered or not. There is a 
good chance o f bacteria entering punctured skin, causing infection and the removal of 
service members from their units for medical reasons. This would be counterproductive 
to units and cause problems with morale and discipline because service members rely on 
one another to protect themselves and their country.
The military’s restrictions on body art are currently justifiable as necessary for the 
maintenance of morale, discipline and order. As noted above the U.S. Supreme Court has 
found military need to be justification enough for restricting such rights as freedom of 
religion as associated with wearing of the yarmulke and other religious items ( v.
Weinberger, 1986). The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that uniformity and the 
suppression of individuality are necessary to assure the maintenance of morale, discipline 
and order. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated, “[bjecause professionals in the military 
service attach great importance to that plausible interest, it is one that we must recognize 
as legitimate and rational...” ( Goldmanv. Weinberger, 1986, p. 512).
The U.S. Supreme Court has also identified that certain forms of speech are not 
permitted in the military due to their affect on morale, discipline and order. The separate 
community has been accepted by the U.S. Supreme Court allowing the military to restrict
body art in the name of morale, discipline, order and most important, that body art would 
possibly interfere with the military’s primary mission to defend national interests against 
internal and external threats.
Summary
In this discussion it has been shown that the military has four primary reasons, 
supported by the U.S. Supreme Court, for restricting service members constitutional 
rights: 1) To properly maintain good order, discipline and morale; 2) To properly 
maintain uniformity of all service members in not only appearance, but also in treatment; 
3) To properly maintain the separate community of the military requires such actions; 4) 
The courts should defer to military expertise when dealing with issues affecting the 
operation of the military. When looking at future conflicts with service members’ rights 
it will most likely be essential to determine if the service members’ constitutional rights 
clash with any of the above-mentioned justifications. If the service members’ 
constitutional rights do conflict with one of these justifications then the rights will most 
likely not be permitted in the military. As an example of this, this thesis reviewed at the 
military body art policies and how they will most likely end up being deferred back to the 
military and what military leaders deem appropriate. The military will most likely justify 
the need to restrict body art based on good order, discipline, morale and uniformity.
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GLOSSARY
airman
The term for U.S. Air Force service members, 
armed forces
The military force of a nation. This includes every branch of the military; currently 
includes the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marines and U.S. Coast Guard 
(DoD, 2001).
body art
Methods people use to change the natural appearance their bodies through various 
additions. Body art includes such things as tattooing, body piercing and branding 
(Campanella, 1999).
certiorari
(Latin) A writ o f superior court to call up the records of an inferior court or a body acting 
in a quasi-judicial capacity (Merriam-Webster’s, 1999).
command
The authority military leaders lawfully exercise over subordinates by virtue of rank or 
assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using 
available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, 
coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned 
missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale and discipline of 
assigned personnel (DoD, 2001).
command influence
The ability of military leaders to persuade unit(s) to do what they want. There are lawful 
command influences, such as promotions and awards and there are unlawful command 
influences, such as personal beliefs being impressed on the command.
commander
Military leaders in official positions of command or control (Merriam-Webster’s, 1999) 
commissioned officer
Officers of the armed forces holding by commission the rank of second lieutenant or 
ensign or above (Merriam-Webster’s, 1999).
convening authority
Commissioned officers with the authority to prefer charges against service members. 
Typically defendants’ commanders or another individual in accused’s succession of 
command.
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courts-martial
Courts consisting of commissioned offers and in some instances enlisted personnel for 
trials of members of the armed forces or others within their jurisdiction (Merriam- 
Webster’s, 1999).
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF)
The third name for the final military court of appeals. Initially it was called the Court of 
Military Appeals (COMA). In 1968, Congress re-designated COMA as the U.S. Court of 
Military Appeals. On October 5, 1994, the court was again re-designated as CAAF 
(http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov, 2003).
Court of Military Appeals (COMA)
The predecessor to CAAF. COMA was co-created with the UCMJ and the MCM (Lurie,
2001).
de novo
(Latin) Over again (Merriam-Webster’s, 1999).
Department of Defense (DoD) Directive
Instructions that apply to all members of the military, regardless of service branch, 
dreadlocks
A narrow ropelike strand of hair formed by matting or braiding (Merriam-Webster’s, 
1999)
Haile Selassie
Bom on July 17, 1891, with lineage to the Ethiopian dynasty and considered the founding 
father of Rastafarianism (http://www.duboislc.com, 2003).
Hebrews
A member of or descendant from one of a group of northern Semitic peoples including 
the Israelites (Merriam-Webster’s, 1999).
Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM)
Regulation issued by the President prescribing detailed procedures to be followed before 
military tribunals, including the manner of proof and rules of evidence (Dahl & Whelan, 
1960). The MCM consists of five parts: Preamble, Rules for Courts-Martial, Military 
Rules of Evidence, Punitive Articles and Nonjudicial Punishment Procedures (MCM, 
2002).
marine
The term for U.S. Marine service members.
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military rules of evidence
The third section o f the MCM. Regulates the modes of proof at courts-martial (MCM,
2002).
nonjudicial punishment
A disciplinary measure more serious than administrative corrective measures but less 
serious than trial by courts-martial (MCM, 2002). Typically involves restrictions, 
forfeiture of pay or loss of rank.
preferral
The process of bringing charges against an individual (MCM, 2002). 
punitive articles
The fourth section of the MCM. Explains the articles of the UCMJ that are punishable. 
Also describes the articles’ elements, identifies lesser-included offenses, establishes the 
maximum punishments and provides specific examples (MCM, 2002).
Rastafarianism
A religious cult among black Jamaicans that teaches the eventual redemption of blacks 
and their return to Africa, employs the ritualistic use of marijuana, forbids the cutting of 
hair and venerates Haile Selassie as a god (Merriam-Webster’s, 1999).
Rules for Courts-Martial (RCM)
The second section of the MCM. Governs pre-trial, trial and post-trial procedures 
(MCM, 2002).
sailor
The term for U.S. Navy service members, 
service branch
One of the components of the armed forces. The branches currently are: 
service member
Generic term for any person currently in one of the branches of service, 
soldier
The term for U.S. Army service members, 
tongue bifurcation
The process of surgically dividing the tongue down the middle to give it a forked 
appearance.
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Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
A uniform system that explicitly lays out the laws for all military branches. The UCMJ is 
designed to function during both peace and wartime (Prugh, 2000).
unit
Any military element whose structure is prescribed by competent authority, such as a 
table of organization and equipment; specifically, part o f an organization (FM 101-5-1, 
1997).
voir dire
(Anglo-French) To speak truly; to tell the truth. A preliminary examination to determine 
the competency o f witnesses or jurors (Merriam-Webster’s, 1999).
war
A state of open and declared armed hostile conflicts between states or nations (Merriam- 
Webster’s, 1999).
yarmulke
A skullcap worn especially by Orthodox and Conservative Jewish males (Merriam- 
Webster’s, 1999).
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Appendix A 
Marine Corps Body Art Policy
ALMAR Number: 194/96
R 160900Z MAY 96 ZYB
FM CMC WASHINGTON DC//MCUB//
TO ALMAR 
BT
UNCLAS 
ALMAR 194/96
MSGID/GENADMIN/CMC MCUB//
SUBJ/MCBUL 1020.34 UNIFORM REGULATIONS PERTAINING TO TATTOOS, 
BODY
PIERCING AND BRANDING//
REF/A/DOC/MCO/1020.34F//
AMPN/REF IS MARINE CORPS UNIFORM REGULATIONS//
RMKS/1. PURPOSE. TO PROVIDE UPDATED REGULATIONS CONCERNING A 
POLICY TO BE IMPLEMENTED REGARDING TATTOOS, BODY PIERCING AND 
BRANDING.
2. ACTION.
A. DELETE PARAGRAPH 1005.7A IN ITS ENTIRELY AND REPLACE WITH 
FOLLOWING:
"A. MARINES ARE ASSOCIATED AND IDENTIFIED WITH THE MARINE 
CORPS IN AND OUT OF UNIFORM, AND WHEN ON OR OFF DUTY. 
THEREFORE, WHEN CIVILIAN CLOTHING IS WORN, MARINES WILL ENSURE 
THAT THEIR DRESS AND PERSONAL APPEARANCE ARE CONSERVATIVE 
AND COMMENSURATE WITH THE HIGH STANDARDS TRADITIONALLY
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ASSOCIATED WITH THE MARINE CORPS. NO ECCENTRICITIES OF DRESS 
WILL BE PERMITTED. MARINES ARE PROHIBITED FROM:
(1) WEARING EARRINGS (APPLICABLE TO MALE MARINES)
AND;
(2) ATTACHING, AFFIXING OR DISPLAYING OBJECTS, ARTICLES, 
JEWELRY OR ORNAMENTATION TO OR THROUGH THEIR SKIN. FEMALE 
MARINES, HOWEVER, MAY WEAR EARRINGS CONSISTENT WITH 
PARAGRAPH 3009."
B. ADD THE FOLLOWING NEW PARAGRAPH 1005.7B:
"TATTOOS OR BRANDS ON THE NECK AND HEAD ARE PROHIBITED. IN 
OTHER AREAS OF THE BODY, TATTOOS OR BRANDS THAT ARE 
PREJUDICIAL TO GOOD ORDER, DISCIPLINE AND MORALE OR ARE OF A 
NATURE TO BRING DISCREDIT UPON THE MARINE CORPS ARE ALSO 
PROHIBITED."
C. ADD THE FOLLOWING NEW PARAGRAPH 1005.7C:
"THIS REGULATION DOES NOT PROHIBIT NECESSARY MEDICAL OR 
SURGICAL PROCEDURES CONDUCTED BY LICENSED, QUALIFIED, MEDICAL 
PERSONNEL."
D. RENUMBER PARAGRAPHS 1005.7B AND 1005.7C AS 1005.7D AND 
1005.7E, RESPECTIVELY.
3. RESERVE APPLICABILITY. THIS BULLETIN IS APPLICABLE TO THE 
MARINE CORPS RESERVE.
4. CANCELLATION CONTINGENCY. THIS BULLETIN IS CANCELED WHEN 
INCORPORATED IN THE REFERENCE.//
BT
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Appendix B
Army Body Art Policy
pp. 5 -  6 from Army Regulation 670-1 Wear and Appearance o f  Army Uniforms 
and Insignia
e. Tattoo policy
(1) Tattoos or brands that are visible in a class A uniform (worn with slacks/trousers) are 
prohibited.
(2) Tattoos or brands that are extremist, indecent, sexist, or racist are prohibited, 
regardless of location on the body, as they are prejudicial to good order and discipline 
within units.
(a)Extremist tattoos or brands are those affiliated with, depicting, or symbolizing 
extremist philosophies, organizations, or activities. Extremist philosophies, organizations, 
and activities are those which advocate racial, gender or ethnic hatred or intolerance; 
advocate, create, or engage in illegal discrimination based on race, color, gender, 
ethnicity, religion, or national origin; or advocate violence or other unlawful means of 
depriving individual rights under the U.S. Constitution, Federal, or State law (see para 4 -  
12, AR 600-20).
(b)Indecent tattoos or brands are those that are grossly offensive to modesty, 
decency, or propriety; shock the moral sense because of their vulgar, filthy, or disgusting 
nature or tendency to incite lustful thought; or tend reasonably to corrupt morals or incite 
libidinous thoughts.
(c) Sexist tattoos or brands are those that advocate a philosophy that degrades or 
demeans a person based on gender, but that may not meet the same definition of 
“indecent.”
(d) Racist tattoos or brands are those that advocate a philosophy that degrades or 
demeans a person based on race, ethnicity, or national origin.
(3) Counseling requirements.
(a) Commanders will ensure soldiers understand the tattoo policy.
(b)For soldiers who are not in compliance, commanders may not order the 
removal of a tattoo or brand. However, the commander must counsel soldiers, and afford 
them the opportunity to seek medical advice about removal or alteration of the tattoo or 
brand.
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(4) If soldiers are not in compliance with the policy, and refuse to remove or alter the 
tattoos or brands, commanders will:
(a) Ensure the soldier understands the policy.
(b) Ensure the soldier has been afforded the opportunity to seek medical advice 
about removal or alteration.
(c)Counsel the soldier in writing. The counseling form will state that the soldier’s 
refusal to remove extremist, indecent, sexist, or racist tattoos or brands anywhere on the 
body, or refusal to remove any type of tattoo or brand visible in the class A uniform 
(worn with slacks/trousers), will result in discharge.
(5) Existing tattoos or brands on the hands that are not extremist, indecent, sexist, or 
racist, but are visible in the class A uniform (worn with slacks/trousers) are authorized for 
current soldiers only. This “grandfather” provision does not apply to soldiers enlisting as 
of the effective date of this regulation.
(6) Finality of determination.
(a)Recruiting battalion commanders or recruiting battalion executive officers will 
make initial entry determinations that tattoos or brands comply with this policy. This 
authority will not be delegated further.
(b) Unit commanders or unit executive officers will make determinations for 
soldiers currently on active duty. This authority will not be delegated further.
(c) Determinations will be fully documented in writing, and will include a 
description of existing tattoos or brands and their location on the body. A copy of the 
determination will be provided to the soldier. Unless otherwise directed by the Army 
Deputy Chief of Staff, G -l, these determinations are final. If a tattoo or brand is 
discovered to violate this policy after an initial determination has been documented, 
commanders must submit requests for an exception to policyor for discharge of the 
soldier through their chain of command to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G -l, for 
approval.
(7) Soldiers may not cover tattoos or brands in order to comply with the tattoo policy.
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Appendix C
Air Force Body Art Policy
Table 2-5, pp. 92-94 from Air Force Instruction (AFI) 36-2903: Dress and 
Appearance o f  Air Force Personnel
Body Alteration or Modifications
Prohibited, if it is intentional and results in a visible, physical effect that detracts from 
a professional military image. Failure to observe these mandatory provisions and 
prohibitions by active duty Air Force members, USAFR members on active duty 
or inactive duty for training and ANG members in Federal service is a violation 
of Article 92, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). See note 1.
Tattoos/Brands
Unauthorized (content): Tattoos/Brands anywhere on the body that are obscene, 
advocate sexual, racial, ethnic, or religious discrimination are prohibited in and out of 
uniform. Tattoos/brands that are prejudicial to good order and discipline, or of a nature 
that tends to bring discredit upon the Air Force are prohibited in and out of uniform.
Any member obtaining unauthorized tattoos will be required to remove them at their own 
expense. Using uniform items to cover unauthorized tattoos is not an option. Members 
failing to remove unauthorized tattoos in a timely manner will be subject to involuntary 
separation, or punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Failure 
to observe these mandatory provisions and prohibitions by active duty Air Force 
members, USAFR members on active duty or inactive duty for training and ANG 
members in Federal service is a violation of Article 92, Uniform Code of Military 
Justice (UCMJ).
Inappropriate (military image): Excessive tattoos/brands will not be exposed or visible 
(includes visible through the uniform) while in uniform. Excessive is defined as any 
tattoo/brands that exceed lA o f the exposed body part and those above the collarbone and 
readily visible when wearing an open collar uniform.
Members will not be allowed to display excessive tattoos that would detract from an 
appropriate professional image while in uniform. Commanders will use the above 
guidelines in determining appropriate military image and acceptability of tattoos 
displayed by members in uniform. Air Force members with existing tattoos not meeting 
an acceptable military image should be required to
(a) maintain complete coverage of the tattoos using current uniforms items 
(e.g. long-sleeved shirt/blouse, pants/slacks, dark hosiery, etc.) or
(b) volunteer to remove tattoos(s).
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Members who receive tattoos/brands not meeting the standards after the effective date of 
this policy (1998) are required to initiate tattoos/brands removal upon notification by their 
Commander at their own expense (may not use Air Force Medical Centers for removal). 
Members not complying with these requirements will be subject to disciplinary action for 
failure to comply with Air Force Standards and may be involuntarily separated. Failure 
to observe these mandatory provisions and prohibitions by active duty Air Force 
members, USAFR members on active duty or inactive duty for training and ANG 
members in Federal service is a violation of Article 92, Uniform Code of Military 
Justice (UCMJ). (See notes 2, 3,4).
Body Piercing 
In Uniform:
Members are prohibited from attaching, affixing or displaying objects, articles, jewelry or 
ornamentation to or through the ear, nose, tongue, or any exposed body part (includes 
visible through the uniform). EXCEPTION: Women are authorized to wear one small 
spherical, conservative, diamond, gold, white pearl, or silver pierced, or clip earring per 
earlobe and the earring worn in each earlobe must match. Earring should fit tightly 
without extending below the earlobe. ( EXCPTION: Connecting band on clip earrings.)
Civilian Attire:
(1) Official duty: Members are prohibited from attaching, affixing or displaying objects, 
articles, jewelry or ornamentation to or through the ear, nose, tongue, or any exposed 
body part (includes visible through clothing). EXCEPTION: Women are authorized to 
wear one small spherical, conservative, diamond, gold, white pearl, or silver pierced, or 
clip earring per earlobe and the earring worn in each earlobe must match. Earring should 
fit tightly without extending below the earlobe. ( Connecting band on clip
earrings). (See notes 2 and 4).
(2) Off duty on a military installation: Members are prohibited from attaching, affixing or 
displaying objects, articles, jewelry or ornamentation to or through the ear, nose, tongue, 
or any exposed body part (includes visible through clothing). EXCEPTION: Piercing of 
earlobes by women is allowed, but should not be extreme or excessive. The type and style 
of earrings worn by women on a military installation should be conservative and kept 
within sensible limits. Failure to observe these mandatory provisions and 
prohibitions by active duty Air Force members, USAFR members on active duty or 
inactive duty for training and ANG members in Federal service is a violation of 
Article 92, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). (See notes 2 and 4).
Notes:
1. Members who intentionally alter or modify any part of their bodies in order to achieve 
a visible, physical effect that disfigures, deforms or otherwise detracts from a professional 
military image may be subject to disciplinary action or involuntary separation, as 
determined appropriate by the member’s commander. Examples of prohibited conduct
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include (but are not limited to) tongue splitting or forking, tooth filing and acquiring 
visible, disfiguring skin implants.
2. Installation or higher commanders may impose more restrictive standards for tattoos 
and body ornaments, on or off duty, in those locations where the Air Force-wide 
standards may not be adequate to address cultural sensitivities (e.g.; overseas) or mission 
requirements (e.g.; basic training environments).
3. Members who receive tattoos/brands not meeting the standards are required to initiate 
tattoos/brands removal at their own expense (may not use Air Force Medical Centers for 
removal) upon notification by their Commander. Members not complying with these 
requirements will be subject to disciplinary action for failure to comply with Air Force 
Standards and may be involuntarily separated.
4. There may be situations where the commander can restrict the wear o f non-visible body 
ornaments. Those situations would include any body ornamentation that interferes with 
the performance of the member’s military duties. The factors to be evaluated in making 
this determination include, but are not limited to: impairs the safe and effective operation 
of weapons, military equipment or machinery; poses a health or safety hazard to the 
wearer or others; or interferes with the proper wear of special or protective clothing or 
equipment ( EXAMPLE: helmets, flack jackets, flight suits, camouflaged uniforms, gas 
masks, wet suits and crash rescue equipment).
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Appendix D 
Navy Body Art Policy 
NAVADMIN021-03dated January 2003 revision to NAVPERS15665
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) approved significant revisions to the Navy 
personal appearance policy. These changes are effective immediately and will be reflected 
in the next change to uniform regulations. The revisions include:
A. Establishment of a tattoo policy for Navy personnel.
B. Clarification of personal appearance policy with regard to intentional 
mutilation of body parts.
C. Clarification of personal appearance policy with regard to dental 
ornamentation.
Navy grooming and personal appearance policy is intended to ensure that navy personnel 
set and maintain the highest standards of professional appearance in uniform. Due to the 
increasing popularity of body art and ornamentation, Navy policy is being revised to 
provide clearly defined guidance.
For clarification purposes, revisions and additions to navy uniform regulations, article 
2201 are quoted below in their entirety, (r) indicates revision, (a) indicates addition.
(r) Personal appearance. Because it is impossible to provide examples of every 
appropriate or unacceptable hairstyle or of "conservative" or "eccentric" grooming and 
personal appearance, the good judgement of leaders at all levels is key to enforcement of 
Navy grooming policy. Therefore, hair/grooming/personal appearance while in uniform 
shall present a neat, professional appearance.
(a) Tattoos/body art/brands. No tattoos/body art/brands on the head, face, neck, or 
scalp. Tattoos/body art/brands elsewhere on the body that are prejudicial to good order, 
discipline and morale or are of a nature to bring discredit upon the Navy are prohibited. 
For example, tattoos/body art/brands that are excessive, obscene, sexually explicit or 
advocate or symbolize sex, gender, racial, religious, ethnic or national origin 
discrimination are prohibited. In addition, tattoos/body art/brands that advocate or 
symbolize gang affiliation, supremacist or extremist groups, or drug use are prohibited. 
Tattoos/body art/brands will not be visible through uniform clothing. Waivers may be 
requested for prior service and existing tattoos from the Chief of Naval Operations.
(a) Mutilation. Intentional body mutilation, piercing, branding/intentional scarring that 
are excessive or eccentric are prohibited. Some examples are:
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(1) a split or forked tongue;
(2) foreign objects inserted under the skin to create a design or pattern;
(3) enlarged or stretched out holes in the ears (other than a normal 
piercing).
(4) intentional scarring that appears on the neck, face, or scalp. Waivers 
may be requested for prior service and existing body mutilation, piercing, 
branding/intentional scarring from the Chief of Naval Operations.
(a) Dental ornamentation. The use of gold, platinum or other veneers or caps for 
purposes of ornamentation are prohibited. Teeth, whether natural, capped or veneer, will 
not be ornamented with designs, jewels, initials, etc. Waivers may be requested for prior 
service and existing dental ornamentation from the chief of naval operations (n09bu)."
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Appendix E 
Coast Guard Body Art Policy 
Commandant Instruction 1000.1
APR 2 1999 
COMDTINST 1000.1
COMMANDANT INSTRUCTION 1000.1
Subj: TATTOO AND BODY MARKINGS POLICY FOR COAST GUARD 
ACCESSIONS
Ref: (a) Uniform Regulations, COMDTINST M l020.6 (series)
(b) Medical Manual, COMDTINST M6000.1 (series)
1. PURPOSE. This Instruction establishes the Coast Guard's Tattoo and Body Markings 
Policy for Coast Guard Accessions.
2. ACTION. This Instruction applies to Commander, Coast Guard Personnel Command; 
Superintendent, Coast Guard Academy; and Commanding Officer, Training Center Cape 
May, NJ.
3. DIRECTIVES AFFECTED. The following instructions will be amended to reflect this 
policy: Uniform Regulations, COMDTINST M1020.6 (series)), Recruiting Manual 
(COMDTINST M l 100.2 (series)), Medical Manual (COMDTINST M6000.1 (series)), 
and the Personnel Manual (COMDTINST M1000.6).
4. BACKGROUND. A number of recruits reporting to accession commands have been 
deemed unsuitable due to tattoos or other types of body markings incompatible with the 
Coast Guard's core values. In order to alleviate the burden of processing these individuals 
for discharge and the associated costs, the Coast Guard must establish Tattoo and Body 
Markings Policy for Accessions.
5. DISCUSSION. Reference (a) states: "Every Coast Guard member is a representative of 
the United States government and their dress and conduct must be such as to reflect credit 
upon themselves, the Coast Guard, and the country." Furthermore section l.G.8. of 
reference (a) states: "Tattoos, brands, or intentional scarring of the head and neck are 
prohibited." Furthermore, any markings of the body that are contrary to published basic 
core values of the Coast Guard, prejudicial to good order and discipline, or morale, or are 
of a nature to bring discredit upon the service are prohibited." Section I.E. of reference 
(a) states: "No eccentricities or faddishness in appearance will be permitted. Judgments
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will be made by the command on prevailing military standards and traditions, not on 
civilian standards and customs."
6. POLICY. Entrance may be denied to any applicant who has a tattoo or other applied 
body marking contrary to the core values of the Coast Guard which include, but are not 
limited to:
a. Those which identify and espouse criminal or extremist organizations, which would 
include any group which advocates the use of force or violence, advocates supremacist 
causes, or otherwise engages in efforts to deprive individuals or groups of their civil 
rights based on race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation and/or national origin.
b. Those that are in any way linked to illegal drugs or drug use, such as images of 
marijuana or coca leaves; and any drug related words such as marihuana, cocaine, 
heroine, crack, speed, LSD, etc.
c. Those images that are sexual in nature, such as depicting sex organs, female breasts, 
and any words or expressions connoting sex organs, glands, sexual copulation, or other 
sexual activity.
d. Those with demeaning or disdainful racial images or suggest any racial or other 
discriminatory images, words or themes. For example, a swastika or image of a burning 
cross.
There will be tattoo designs or body markings that have multiple meanings that may not 
be universally/commonly known. For example, a symbol of a cartoon character may also 
be a gang symbol in one particular city. These cases shall be reviewed in accordance with 
paragraph 7.e. below.
7. PROCEDURES.
a. Coast Guard Recruiting Offices shall question applicants as to whether they have any 
tattoos or body markings
b. Medical personnel will identify applicants with the questionable tattoos or other body 
markings as described above for policies stated in reference (b). Medical personnel shall 
then refer such applicants to the Recruiting Center or accession commands as applicable.
c. The Recruiting Center and accession commands will use the above as reference in 
determining appropriateness of body markings. Determinations of appropriateness will be 
documented on CG-3307 (Administrative Remarks). If determined appropriate for 
accession, it will be included with other documentation forwarded to the individual's next 
accession point. If the applicant is denied accession due to a determination of an
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inappropriate tattoo or other body marking, current recruiting policy for documentation 
will be followed.
d. Reasons for certain body markings should not be assumed. Coast Guard Recruiting 
Centers and other accession commands must ensure through questioning that the 
applicant be given a fair assessment and a determination is reached without personal bias 
or any predetermined outcome.
e. When appropriateness cannot be determined by recruiting or other accession 
commands, the case shall be forwarded to Commandant (G-WPM). A description or 
photograph of the body marking and its location on the applicant's body along with a 
statement from the applicant indicating the meaning and or definition as appropriate will 
be forwarded to: Commandant (G-WPM), U. S. Coast Guard, 2100 Second Street, S.W., 
Washington, DC 20593-0001. Commandant (G-WPM) will review the questionable body 
marking(s), and inform the command and member of the decision.
f. If subsequent to processing of the applicant, a prohibited tattoo or body marking is 
discovered at an accession command, Commanding Officer, Training Center Cape May 
or Superintendent, Coast Guard Academy may discharge the member. All other cases of 
inappropriate or questionable body markings shall be referred to Commandant (G-WPM).
g. If an applicant meets all qualifications for enlistment except for a disqualifying body 
marking(s), an individual may reapply once the disqualifying marking has been removed 
or altered so as not to be disqualifying. All expenses incurred in the altering/removal 
process will be borne by the individual.
/s/ F. L. AMES
Assistant Commandant for Human Resources
